Need absolutely transparent choices? - I have them
The 21st century is in the yard, and we continue to vote with “pebbles”. Let's change it. Moreover, there are more and more “digital” tools for this.
Electronic voting systems are being developed all over the world. The emphasis is on both iron (for example, in India (1) and DARPA (2) ), as well as software (ElectionGuard (3) and electronic elections to the Moscow City Duma (4) ). Here we talk about the part that relates to software.
In both systems (ElectionGuard and systems for the Moscow City Duma), the emphasis is on protecting transmitted information from the browser of the voter to the system’s repository, as well as protecting the anonymity of voting. The undoubted advantage of the ElectionGuard system is the ability to recount the voting results to anyone. The advantage of the system for the Moscow City Duma is the storage of data on the blockchain , which guarantees the immutability of the data already entered. But in the description of both systems there is no information on how to protect against internal “stuffing” of votes. When storing anonymous data, making “stuffing” from within the system is theoretically quite simple.
We present to your attention an absolutely transparent voting system with the possibility of recounting votes by anyone who wishes and the complete absence of the possibility of “stuffing” votes from within - Zakogo.rf (5) !
The first is achieved by storing data on the blockchain. The second is the non-anonymity of the vote. IIIii wait to throw all rubbish ... Now you will understand everything.
We use two blockchains:
Access to the “closed” blockchain is not available to anyone except the owner of the system. The data of the “open” blockchain can be downloaded for verification by anyone. The verification script is attached. Given that the hash of the “closed” block is stored in the “open” block and is also involved in calculating the hash of the “open” block, changing the “closed” blockchain is impossible.
Now let's talk about non-anonymity. Storing information about the voter allows special bodies to verify the absence of “stuffing”. We take a certain percentage of all blocks, for each block we look at the information about the voter, contact him and find out whether it is true that he voted. With complete anonymity in the repository, you can download almost any number of votes. In this case, the method of organizing the storage does not matter.
What is more important: anonymity of voting or transparency of elections? Humanity has yet to answer this question. For me, the answer is obvious: the state knows so much about me that a little more knowledge will not hurt me (we will leave the quality of protection of this information outside the scope of the article).
In the next versions we plan:
PS By the way, the first absolutely transparent vote is already underway (for example, the election of regional leaders). Join on Zakogo.rf (5) !
References:
Electronic voting systems are being developed all over the world. The emphasis is on both iron (for example, in India (1) and DARPA (2) ), as well as software (ElectionGuard (3) and electronic elections to the Moscow City Duma (4) ). Here we talk about the part that relates to software.
In both systems (ElectionGuard and systems for the Moscow City Duma), the emphasis is on protecting transmitted information from the browser of the voter to the system’s repository, as well as protecting the anonymity of voting. The undoubted advantage of the ElectionGuard system is the ability to recount the voting results to anyone. The advantage of the system for the Moscow City Duma is the storage of data on the blockchain , which guarantees the immutability of the data already entered. But in the description of both systems there is no information on how to protect against internal “stuffing” of votes. When storing anonymous data, making “stuffing” from within the system is theoretically quite simple.
We present to your attention an absolutely transparent voting system with the possibility of recounting votes by anyone who wishes and the complete absence of the possibility of “stuffing” votes from within - Zakogo.rf (5) !
The first is achieved by storing data on the blockchain. The second is the non-anonymity of the vote. IIIii wait to throw all rubbish ... Now you will understand everything.
We use two blockchains:
- “Closed”, to store information about who voted and how;
- “Open”, for storing anonymous voting information and the hash of the corresponding “closed” block.
Access to the “closed” blockchain is not available to anyone except the owner of the system. The data of the “open” blockchain can be downloaded for verification by anyone. The verification script is attached. Given that the hash of the “closed” block is stored in the “open” block and is also involved in calculating the hash of the “open” block, changing the “closed” blockchain is impossible.
Now let's talk about non-anonymity. Storing information about the voter allows special bodies to verify the absence of “stuffing”. We take a certain percentage of all blocks, for each block we look at the information about the voter, contact him and find out whether it is true that he voted. With complete anonymity in the repository, you can download almost any number of votes. In this case, the method of organizing the storage does not matter.
What is more important: anonymity of voting or transparency of elections? Humanity has yet to answer this question. For me, the answer is obvious: the state knows so much about me that a little more knowledge will not hurt me (we will leave the quality of protection of this information outside the scope of the article).
In the next versions we plan:
- replace authorization through social networks, with authorization through State services;
- take advantage of the experience of the ElectionGuard (3) and Moscow City Duma (4) projects on data protection at the stage from the user's browser to the system storage.
PS By the way, the first absolutely transparent vote is already underway (for example, the election of regional leaders). Join on Zakogo.rf (5) !
References:
- Electronic voting machine in India ;
- Electronic voting machine commissioned by DARPA ;
- ElectionGuard from Galois and Microsoft ;
- Electronic elections to the Moscow City Duma ;
- Our system ZaKogo.rf .
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